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The international donor community has grave concerns about the prospects for poverty 
reduction in what it terms fragile states. A state is classified as fragile if its country 
policy and institutional assessment (CPIA) score falls below a particular threshold. 
Recognizing that all states are fragile to varying degrees, this paper questions the 
method used by the international community to deem a country fragile. This paper 
develops a framework that uses fuzzy-set theory to deem a country as fragile. Fuzzy 
sets allow for gradual transition from one state to another while also allowing one to 
incorporate rules and goals, and hence are more appropriate for measuring outcomes 
…/. 
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that are ambiguous. Such ambiguity is an inherent characteristic of cross-country 
fragility classifications. The paper applies its framework to 76 low-income countries, 
for which the CPIA data are publicly available. The fragile state group that this 
framework provides is compared to that which the international donor community has 
constructed. 
Acronyms 
CPIA  country policy and institutional assessment  
CPR  country performance ratings  
DAC Development  Assistance Committee of OECD 
IDA  International Development Association  
LICUS  low-income country under stress 
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1 Introduction 
The international donor community has grave concerns about the effectiveness of aid to 
countries it classifies as fragile states. The positive impact of aid on growth and poverty 
reduction, and the ability to efficiently absorb additional inflows are thought to be 
significantly low in these countries compared to other recipients. In some donor circles 
this impact is even thought to be non-existent (Torres and Anderson 2004; McGillivray 
2006. Donors insist that unless aid can be made to work better in fragile states, the 
intended developmental dividend from these increased flows will not be observed, and 
the worldwide achievement of the much espoused Millennium Development Goals will 
not be possible in the foreseeable future, let alone by the agreed target of 2015 
(Branchflower et al. 2004). 
Two alternative fragile state classifications are employed by the international donor 
community. The first was proposed by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It classifies 
a country as fragile if it belongs to the bottom two quintiles of the World Bank’s 
country policy and institutional assessment (CPIA) ratings or was not rated in the 
current CPIA rating exercise. CPIA ratings are prepared annually by World Bank staff 
and consist of 20 criteria1 related to the appropriateness of a country’s economic 
policies and the performance of its public institutions. Thirty-five countries were 
classified as fragile according to the approach in 2004. The second deems a country 
fragile if it is a low income country that has a CPIA score of 3.0 or less. These are also 
the criteria that the World Bank uses to allocate a country to the low-income country 
under stress (LICUS) group. Forty-six countries were classified as fragile states 
according to this definition in 2004.2 
The reason why the inability to efficiently absorb aid inflows for growth and poverty 
reduction is in effect measured by CPIA scores reflects an implicit consensus within 
much of the international donor community regarding aid effectiveness. That consensus 
is that the impact of aid on income growth, poverty reduction and other developmental 
outcomes is conditional on recipient country policy regimes and institutional 
performance. Specifically, the consensus is that the more appropriate these regimes are 
from a developmental perspective and the better the performance of these institutions, 
the greater will be the incremental effectiveness of aid. This consensus is based on the 
findings of the well-known and extremely influential aid-growth paper by Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) and subsequent papers by Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002). Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) estimate a growth model that includes a variable obtained by 
multiplicatively interacting a measure of policy and aid. The relationship between 
                                                 
1   Since 2004 the number of criteria has been reduced to 16. The CPIA overall score is obtained by 
adding up the average scores from four clusters and assigning equal weight (25 per cent) to each. The 
criteria within each cluster have equal weight. 
2   The international donor community’s concerns over fragile states are easy to understand if one looks 
at the plight of these countries. According to the second classification, roughly one-third of the 
world’s population who live in extreme income poverty, some 340 million people, reside in fragile 
states. Of the estimated 10.8 million children who died before their fifth birthday in 2002, just over 40 
percent lived in these 46 states (Branchflower et al. 2004). One should also acknowledge that, as is 
evident from this discussion, the term fragile state, as used in the donor community, might be 
misleading, to the extent that it is not used to delineate states only in terms of their likelihood of 
breaking-up or vulnerability to downside shocks.  2 
growth and this interaction was found to be linear, positive and statistically significant 
at all levels of growth and the aid-policy interaction variables. Collier and Dollar did 
and found likewise, but for an interaction of the CPIA and aid. On the other hand, recent 
empirical studies show that the impact of policies on aid effectiveness is not robust or 
inexistent (Easterly, Levine and Roodman 2004; Baliamoune-Lutz 2006a). 
This paper questions the manner in which the donor community delineates fragile from 
non-fragile states. In short, there seems to be no clear or obvious justification for the 
CPIA thresholds used to partition fragile from non-fragile states. Indeed, the results of 
the Burnside-Dollar and Collier-Dollar studies would tend to suggest that no such 
partition exists in reality. The results of these studies tell us that if we associate fragility 
with aid effectiveness, all countries are fragile to the extent that their ability to use aid 
differs. Some are simply more fragile than others.3 Given this, and assuming that aid 
effectiveness does indeed vary among states according to their policies and institutional 
performance, how might one partition fragile from not-so-fragile states? A number of 
approaches might be valid, but let us highlight two. The first would be to revisit the 
research of Burnside-Dollar and Collier-Dollar, to seek to establish whether there has 
been a previously undetected significant structural break in the aid-policy and 
institutions-growth relationship. The CPIA score at which this break occurs would then 
be used to partition countries on the basis of their perceived fragility. The second 
approach would be to acknowledge that such partitioning is not an opaque outcome, that 
differences in degrees of fragility among countries are not always crisp, clean and 
unambiguous. It is not clear, for example, that a country with a CPIA score of 3.0 uses 
aid observably better than one with a CPIA score of 2.9.  
This paper adopts the second of the above-mentioned approaches. We develop a 
framework that uses fuzzy-set theory to deem a country as fragile. Fuzzy sets allow for 
gradual transition from one state to another while also allowing one to incorporate rules 
and goals, and hence are more appropriate for measuring outcomes that are ambiguous 
or opaque. The paper applies its framework to 76 low-income countries, for which the 
CPIA data are publicly available. The fragile-state group that this framework provides is 
compared to the list which the international donor community would construct using the 
first of the above-mentioned classification criterion, a CPIA score that belongs to the 
bottom two quintiles of these scores. 
2 Fuzzy  CPIA 
2.1  Method 
Lotfi Zadeh (1965) who is widely credited with the conceptualization of fuzzy-set 
theory defines fuzzy sets as a class of objects with a continuum of grades of 
membership.4 Degrees of membership in the set of achievements (or goals) are usually 
                                                 
3   Note that Burnside and Dollar do indicate a level of their policy variable at which aid’s impact on 
growth falls below zero. One might deem a country fragile if aid has no positive impact on growth. 
But there is no evidence that the donor community has done this, as there appears to have been no 
attempt to match this level with those of the CPIA used to deem a country fragile. 
4   Baliamoune-Lutz (2006b) and Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray (2006) provide a discussion of the 
concept of fuzzy set theory and its application. This section draws on these two studies. 3 
expressed by numbers belonging to the interval [0,1]. Fuzzy sets allow for gradual 
transition from one state to another while also allowing one to incorporate rules and 
goals. Thus, fuzzy sets are more appropriate for measuring outcomes that are vague or 
ambiguous.  
In the context of measuring state fragility, fuzzy sets would allow us to examine 
changes in country ranking depending on the degree of vagueness and the level 
(threshold) at which performance changes from disastrous to average or good 
(depending on how we define the cutoff point). 
To derive fuzzy CPIA scores, we follow Baliamoune-Lutz (2006b) and Baliamoune-










   (1) 
This function is quite adequate for the purpose of determining, for example, whether the 
outcome is close enough to the goal for it to be considered a success or whether 
differences between two outcomes should be considered as relevant differences. 
Equation (1) is obtained by first noting that the distance between the actual outcome and 
the goal provides a measure of the extent of the success in attaining the goal. If the 
outcome is complete success, we have full membership, i.e., μ(xi) = 1, and the distance 
between the actual outcome and the goal is zero. Thus, d(x) = 0. At the other extreme, a 
complete failure to meet the goal would imply d(x) = 1 and the membership score μ(xi) 
would equal 1. For cases in between these two extremes, d(x) > 0, and μ(xi) < 1. Thus 












   (2) 
Zimmermann (1987) points out that the relationship between physical objects and 
perceptions takes an exponential form. Thus, d(x) can be expressed as: 
−− =
β () ()
i ax dx e . 
Substituting in Equation (2) yields Equation (1). 
It can be shown (see Baliamoune-Lutz 2006b) that the parameters α and β can be 


























































where μh represents the membership degree of the highest achievement (xh) of the goal, 
and μl represents the membership degree of the lowest achievement (xl) of the goal. 4 
2.2 Results 
Using the information from the above discussion and Equation (1), we derive fuzzy 
CPIA scores and report the results in Table 1. The assumptions regarding what 
constitutes high (best) or low (worst) achievement as well as the values for α and β are 
shown in Table A1 in the Appendix. We should note that the parameter (slope) α can be 
used to represent the degree of vagueness or ambiguity and β may be used to represent 
the identification threshold, the score at which a county moves from fragile to stable 
state (see Zimmermann 1987: 205; Baliamoune-Lutz 2006b). 
Table 1 














Fuzzy scores using 
the same alpha and 
beta for all clusters 
Fuzzy scores using 
different alpha and 
beta for each cluster





1 Armenia     4.33      4.50    5.12  4.60 
2 Cape Verde   4.09      4.28    4.97  4.53 
3  Samoa  3.98     4.17   4.83  4.47 
4 St Lucia    3.97      4.16    4.82  4.38 
5  Tanzania  3.94     4.14   4.82  4.30 
6 St Vincent and the Grenadines  3.92     4.11   4.74  4.14 
7  Honduras      3.91     4.10   4.68  3.99 
8 Uganda     3.88      4.08    4.58  3.86 
9 Ghana      3.85      4.04    4.71  4.12 
10 Georgia     3.83      4.03    4.68  4.03 
 Maldives    3.83      4.03    4.65  4.00 
12 Bhutan     3.79      3.99    4.66  4.14 
13  Dominica      3.78     3.98   4.57  3.92 
14  India  3.77     3.96   4.64  4.05 
15  Burkina  Faso  3.76     3.95   4.58  3.93 
16 Senegal     3.75 3.94 4.57  3.92 
17  Vietnam  3.74     3.93   4.54  3.85 
18 Nicaragua    3.72      3.91    4.53  3.83 
19 Bolivia     3.71      3.90    4.42  3.69 
20  Mali  3.71     3.90   4.54  3.89 
21 Serbia and Montenegro  3.70     3.89   4.47  3.75 
22 Grenada     3.69      3.88    4.52  3.93 
23 Albania     3.68      3.86    4.35  3.63 
24  Pakistan      3.66     3.85   4.24  3.53 
25  Azerbaijan    3.65     3.84   4.29  3.59 
 Benin      3.65      3.84    4.37  3.65 
 Indonesia    3.65      3.84    4.30  3.59 
28 Sri Lanka    3.62      3.80    4.41  3.71 
29 Kenya      3.60      3.78    4.28  3.56 
30 Bosnia and Herzegovina  3.59      3.77    4.29  3.57 
31 Madagascar   3.54 3.72 4.29  3.57 
32  Kyrgyz  Republic  3.51     3.68   3.86  3.41 
33 Lesotho     3.51      3.68    4.26  3.54 
34 Moldova     3.50     3.68    4.16 3.45 
35 Rwanda     3.48      3.65    4.19  3.47 
              5 
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Fuzzy scores using 
the same alpha and 
beta for all clusters 
Fuzzy scores using 
different alpha and 
beta for each cluster





36  Mozambique    3.46     3.63   4.08  3.37 
37  Mongolia    3.44      3.61    4.14  3.42 
38  Bangladesh    3.42     3.58   3.87  3.30 
39  Ethiopia    3.38      3.55    3.96  3.29 
40  Guyana     3.35      3.51    3.94  3.27 
41  Malawi  3.35     3.51   4.10  3.38 
42  Nepal  3.34     3.50   3.86  3.23 
 Tajikistan    3.34     3.50    3.64  3.25 
44  Zambia     3.32      3.47    3.96  3.25 
45  Yemen, Republic of 3.29 3.44 3.75  3.17
46  Cameroon      3.29     3.44   3.87  3.20 
47  Niger      3.26      3.41    3.89  3.18 
48 Mauritania    3.16     3.29    3.61 3.04 
49  Kiribati      3.16     3.29   3.78  3.05 
50  Djibouti  3.14     3.27   3.53  3.02 
  Nigeria     3.14      3.27    3.43  2.92 
  Vanuatu     3.14      3.27    3.69  3.02 
53  Sierra  Leone  3.12     3.25   3.50  2.93 
54  Papua New Guinea  3.11      3.24    3.65  2.98 
55  Cambodia    3.09      3.22    3.33  2.94 
56  Gambia, The   3.08      3.21    3.52  2.94 
57  Guinea     3.02      3.13    3.34  2.89 
58 Uzbekistan    3.00     3.11    2.99  2.71 
59  Lao, People’s Democratic Republic  2.98     3.09   3.06  2.73 
60  Sao Tome and Principe  2.98      3.08    3.49  2.81 
61  Burundi     2.97 3.07 3.19  2.74
62  Tonga      2.93      3.03    3.20  2.75 
63  Chad      2.88      2.98    3.02  2.74 
64  Congo, Democratic Republic of  2.84     2.93   2.95  2.72 
65  Solomon  Islands  2.83     2.91   2.98  2.59 
66  Congo, Republic of  2.79     2.87   2.89  2.50 
67  Haiti      2.77      2.84    2.89  2.66 
68  Guinea-Bissau  2.68     2.75   2.86  2.47 
69  Sudan      2.59      2.64    2.64  2.36 
70  Angola     2.58      2.63    2.63  2.35 
71  Eritrea     2.50      2.54    2.33  1.82 
72  Cote  d'Ivoire  2.49     2.53   2.64  2.30 
  Togo      2.49      2.53    2.57  2.37 
74  Comoros     2.42      2.45    2.23  1.99 
75  Central African Republic  2.39     2.42   2.32  2.12 
76  Zimbabwe    1.82      1.82    1.52  1.37 
Note:  a  Five IDA countries excluded since not rated in IRAI 2005 exercise (Afghanistan, Liberia, 
Myanmar, Somalia, and Timor-Leste). 
    For calculation of the cluster averages, all criteria are equally weighted within a cluster; IRAI 
is calculated as the mean of the score of four clusters. Scale: 1 = lowest, 6 = highest. 
Rankings are based on un-rounded data. 
Source:   www.siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA 6 
It is important to note that deciding what constitutes the highest and the lowest 
achievement may be subjective but it is not arbitrary. Indeed, using substantiated rules we 
can build scenario or ranges based on perceived degrees of ambiguity and the identification 
threshold. For example, we could define the CPIA score at which countries move from 
fragile to stable state. In fact, International Development Association (IDA) for example 
does something similar to this when it decides on the cutoff point. The main difference is 
that the use of fuzzy sets allows us to incorporate relevant information about the extent of 
ambiguity and threshold levels. Given that empirical evidence on the positive impact of aid 
on growth and poverty reduction, and the effects of many of the components in the four 
clusters (see Appendix A) used to derive CPIA scores are ambiguous, the use of fuzzy sets 
seems to be more appropriate than the way CPIA scores have been computed so far. 
The scores in Column (1) of Table 1 represent the World Bank CPIA scores also used by 
IDA to represent IDA’s resource allocation index (IRAI). We divided the countries into 
quintiles with the first country and its scores in each new quintile in bold. We compare 
these scores to the ones we have derived using fuzzy sets, Columns (2)-(4). It is clear that 
once we take into account the ambiguity of the outcomes we get different scores from the 
World Bank’s CPIA. In Column (2) we use the same level of ambiguity and the same 
threshold for all four clusters and get overall scores that are higher than the CPIA scores 
but are consistent with the classification of countries in their respective quintiles. 
However, assigning the same ambiguity level to all clusters is not appropriate. For 
example, while there may be a consensus about what gender equality means, it may be 
difficult to get a consensus on the definition of good institutions. Furthermore, some 
components, such as black market premium for example, may have an unambiguous 
effect on growth (based on the empirical literature), while the effect of trade openness on 
growth in low-income countries is at best ambiguous. 
Table 2 
IDA country performance ratings (CPR) and fuzzy CPR scores 
      Fuzzy scores based on the scenarios in Table A2 
  IDA-CPR   (3)  (4)  (5)  (2)  (1) 
Armenia       5.58    5.33   5.32  6.00  5.99  5.99 
Bhutan        5.17    5.11   5.10  6.00  5.97  5.98 
Samoa 5.07    5.04    5.04  6.00  5.97  5.97 
St Lucia     4.92    4.95    4.95  6.00  5.95  5.96 
Cape Verde    4.75    4.82    4.83  6.00  5.94  5.95 
St Vincent   4.50    4.62    4.64  5.99  5.90  5.92 
Tanzania      4.35    4.48    4.51  5.98  5.87  5.90 
Honduras      4.26    4.40   4.43  5.96  5.84  5.89 
Georgia       4.13    4.28   4.32  5.93  5.80  5.86 
Maldives      4.04    4.19   4.23  5.90  5.76  5.84 
Ghana         4.04    4.18   4.23  5.89  5.76  5.84 
Senegal       3.97    4.11   4.16  5.85  5.73  5.82 
Uganda        3.95    4.10   4.15  5.84  5.72  5.81 
Dominica          3.95   4.09  4.14  5.84  5.72  5.81 
Nicaragua     3.94    4.08    4.13  5.83  5.71  5.81 
Azerbaijan    3.79    3.93    3.99  5.66  5.63  5.75 
Sri Lanka     3.79    3.92    3.98  5.66  5.63  5.75 
India 3.77    3.90    3.96  5.61  5.61  5.74 
Mongolia      3.76    3.89   3.96  5.61  5.61  5.74 
            Table  2  con’t7 
Table 2 (con’t)  
IDA country performance ratings (CPR) and fuzzy CPR scores 
      Fuzzy scores based on the scenarios in Table A2 
  IDA-CPR    (3)  (4)  (5)  (2)  (1) 
        
Vietnam  3.76  3.88  3.95  5.59  5.60  5.74 
Grenada       3.70    3.83    3.89  5.48  5.56  5.72 
Burkina  Faso  3.67  3.79  3.86  5.41  5.54  5.70 
Benin         3.67    3.79   3.85  5.39  5.54  5.70 
Mali          3.63    3.75   3.82  5.29  5.51  5.68 
Serbia & Montenegro  3.56    3.66   3.74  5.03  5.44  5.64 
Moldova       3.55    3.65   3.73  4.97  5.43  5.63 
Rwanda        3.53    3.63   3.70  4.89  5.41  5.62 
Albania       3.51    3.61   3.69  4.81  5.39  5.61 
Lesotho       3.44    3.53   3.61  4.44  5.31  5.57 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3.41    3.49   3.58  4.28  5.28  5.55 
Madagascar      3.37  3.45  3.53  4.02  5.23  5.52 
Kenya         3.36    3.43   3.52  3.91  5.21  5.50 
Guyana        3.26    3.31   3.41  3.22  5.08  5.42 
Bolivia       3.23    3.28   3.38  3.01  5.04  5.40 
Mozambique    3.17    3.20    3.30  2.54  4.93  5.34 
Malawi  3.10  3.13  3.23  2.09  4.82  5.27 
Indonesia     3.06    3.07    3.18  1.80  4.74  5.22 
Ethiopia      3.03    3.04   3.15  1.64  4.69  5.19 
Sao Tome-Principe  3.00    3.00   3.11  1.46  4.63  5.15 
Kyrgyz Republic  2.98    2.98   3.09  1.35  4.59  5.13 
Pakistan      2.95    2.94    3.05  1.18  4.52  5.08 
Cameroon      2.91    2.89    3.01  1.02  4.44  5.03 
Kiribati      2.89    2.87    2.99  0.93  4.39  5.01 
Sierra  Leone  2.80  2.76  2.88  0.62  4.17  4.87 
Tajikistan    2.78    2.74    2.86  0.58  4.14  4.84 
Niger         2.72    2.67   2.79  0.45  3.99  4.75 
Yemen  2.72  2.67  2.79  0.44  3.99  4.75 
Zambia        2.70    2.64    2.76    0.39    3.92    4.70 
Gambia, The   2.67    2.61    2.74  0.35  3.86  4.66 
Bangladesh      2.65  2.58  2.71  0.31  3.80  4.61 
Nepal         2.64    2.57   2.70  0.31  3.79  4.61 
Djibouti  2.62  2.55  2.68  0.27  3.72  4.56 
Vanuatu       2.62    2.54   2.67  0.27  3.72  4.56 
Tonga         2.60    2.52   2.65  0.25  3.67  4.53 
Papua New Guinea  2.59    2.51    2.64  0.24  3.64  4.50 
Solomon  Islands  2.52  2.43  2.56  0.17  3.44  4.37 
Mauritania      2.52  2.43  2.56  0.17  3.44  4.36 
Congo, Republic of  2.49    2.39   2.52  0.14  3.35  4.30 
Lao, PDR  2.37    2.26    2.39    0.08    3.02    4.04 
Cambodia      2.36    2.24    2.38  0.08  2.99  4.02 
Guinea-Bissau  2.29  2.16  2.30  0.05  2.78  3.85 
Nigeria       2.25    2.12   2.26  0.04  2.67  3.76 
Burundi       2.23    2.10   2.24  0.04  2.62  3.72 
Guinea        2.02    1.87    2.02    0.01    2.05    3.19 
Angola        1.87    1.72   1.87  0.01  1.69  2.81 
Table 2 con’t 8 
Table 2 (con’t) 
IDA country performance ratings (CPR) and fuzzy CPR scores 
      Fuzzy scores based on the scenarios in Table A2 
  IDA-CPR    (3)  (4)  (5)  (2)  (1) 
        
Uzbekistan 1.86    1.72    1.86    0.01    1.67    2.79 
Eritrea       1.75    1.61   1.75  0.00  1.42  2.50 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  1.70    1.56   1.71  0.00  1.33  2.39 
Comoros       1.70    1.56    1.70    0.00    1.32    2.38 
Côte  d'Ivoire  1.50  1.39  1.53  0.00  0.98  1.92 
Haiti         1.50    1.38   1.52  0.00  0.97  1.91 
Sudan         1.47    1.36   1.50  0.00  0.93  1.85 
Chad          1.47    1.36    1.50    0.00    0.93    1.85 
Central Africa Rep.  1.28    1.20    1.34    0.00    0.67    1.45 
Togo          1.24    1.17   1.31  0.00  0.64  1.39 
Zimbabwe      0.84    0.90   1.02  0.00  0.32  0.80 
Note:  The lines divide the scores to greater than 5, between 4 and 5, between 3 and 4, between 2 
and 3, and less than 2. 
To illustrate how scores would change once we allow for differences in the levels of 
ambiguity and thresholds, we derive scores assuming different values for α and β. In 
particular, we assume higher degree of vagueness and a restrictive (high) threshold for 
public sector management and institutions (cluster D). In Column (3) of Table 1 we 
assume a high level of ambiguity and high identification threshold (by assuming that the 
worst outcome is a score of 3), while in Column (4) we assume very high ambiguity and 
threshold (by assuming that the worst outcome is a score of 4). We show that the results 
for cluster D based on the two scenarios are very different, as can be observed in the last 
two Columns of Table 1. Depending on the levels of ambiguity and threshold, some 
countries may change quintiles. For example, in Column (3) Tajikistan would move to 
quintile 4 while Niger would move up to quintile 3.  
This framework is useful to apply to IDA lending and aid allocation. IDA bases its 
country envelopes on the country’s CPIA. Table 2 shows country performance ratings 
(CPR) scores change dramatically depending on the scenario used (see details in   
Table A2 in the Appendix). 
3 Concluding  remarks 
We applied fuzzy transformations to the 2005 CPIA scores from 76 countries and tried 
to partition fragile from not-so-fragile states taking into account the inherent ambiguity 
in measuring policies and institutions, and assuming that aid effectiveness does indeed 
vary among states according to their policies and institutional performance. The fuzzy 
scores we derived are different from the CPIA scores. These differences imply that 
some countries, particularly the ones close to the border of their quintile (or close to the 
IDA cutoff points) may be incorrectly classified.  
There are many possible sources of ambiguity in CPIA scores but three sources are 
quite obvious and some of them may be associated with poor data collection and low 
transparency, both of which tend to be predominant in most low-income countries. First, 
ambiguity could arise simply from the lack of robust and conclusive evidence on aid 9 
effectiveness and the effect of some economic policies and institutional reforms on 
growth and poverty reduction. Second, ambiguity could result from the questions in the 
World Bank questionnaire used in collecting information on the clusters. Third, the 
respondent’s perception of what he/she thinks as a true picture could also be a source of 
ambiguity. Indeed, a study done by the Africa region at the World Bank concluded the 
following. 
Using the ‘natural experiment’ provided by independent CPIA-type ratings from 
the African Development Bank, the paper estimates the standard deviation of a 
CPIA rating at 0.24 on the 1-6 scale. Our results suggest that it is reasonable to 
disclose ratings within a confidence interval of 0.5 centred on the estimate and to 
allow some flexibility in allocations in response to measurement uncertainty. CPIA 
scores can help to indicate where performance needs to be strengthened and how 
fast this can be done, taking into account both historical performance and what has 
been possible in other countries (World Bank 2004). 
The assigning of CPIA rating can be extremely crucial to a country’s access to aid. The 
CPIA scores are used to decide how IDA assistance is allocated. Indeed, the World 
Bank ranks IDA eligible countries with CPIA scores in governance and overall less than 
or equal to 2.5 as severe, those with rating between 2.5 and 3.0 as core, and countries, 
with rating between 3.0 and 3.2 as marginal. CPIA scores are also used by DAC for aid 
allocation purposes. It is possible that computing CPIA scores the correct way could 
contribute to better aid allocation and aid effectiveness. 10 
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Appendix A 
Table A1 




outcome  μh 
Worst 
outcome  μl  α  β 
A  5 0.833 2 0.334  4.6049  0.4838 
B  6 0.999 2 0.334  11.4135  0.3939 
C  5 0.833 1 0.167  4.8259  0.500 
D  (1)  6 0.999 3 0.500  13.8412  0.500 
D  (2)  6 0.999 4 0.667  18.6969  0.6296 
Note:  *  The scores shown in Table 1 are fuzzy scores derived using the parameters (raw scores) in 
Table A2 and then converting them to the 1-6 scale used by IDA by multiplying the raw 
scores by 6. 
 a  CPIA  clusters: 
    A: Economic management (macro management, fiscal policy, debt policy); 
    B: Structural policies (trade, financial sector, business and regulatory environment); 
    C: Policies for social inclusion/equity (gender equality, equity of public resource use, building 
human resources, social protection and labour, policies and institutions for environmental 
sustainability); 
    D: Public sector management and institutions (property rights and rule-based governance, 
quality of budgetary and financial management, efficiency of revenue mobilization, quality of 
public administration, transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector) 
Source:   www.iteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/ 
Table A2 
Parameters for computing degrees of membership used in Table 2* 
Scenario 
Best 
outcome  μh 
Worst 
outcome  μl  α  β 
(1)  6 0.999 1 0.167  10.2329  0.3240 
(2)  6 0.999 2 0.334  11.4135  0.39386 
(3)  5 0.833 1 0.167  4.8259  0.500 
(4)  5 0.833 2 0.334  4.6033  0.4839 
(5)  6 0.999 0 0.001  29.9336  0.5384 
Note:   *  The scores shown in Table 2 are fuzzy CPR scores derived using the parameters (raw 
scores) in Table A2 and then converting them to the 1-6 scale used by IDA by multiplying 
the raw scores by 6. 
 